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HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
Carl P. Bretscher and Victor N. Balancia
I. INTRODUCTION
In its recent decision in Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Commission,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed a final determination by the U.S. International Trade
Commission ("ITC" or "Commission") that the claims of
Honeywell's U.S. paten ("'976 patent") were invalid as indefinite
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Honeywell is unique in
that the dispute was not so much over the meaning of the term at
issue, "melting point elevation" ("MPE"), as it was over how to
determine its value. Finding that where there were multiple methods
known in the art for determining the melting point of polyethylene
terephthalate ("PET") yam, and that different methods yielded
significantly different results, the Federal Circuit concluded the
claims were indefinite because they failed to reasonably apprise
competitors whether their products were within the scope of the
claims. This case should serve as a warning to patentees and
practitioners to ensure that any quantitative parameters or formulae in
their claims have single, well-understood meaning in the art or are
clearly defined in the patent or prosecution history, particularly where
the patentees have invented that parameter or formula for the purpose
of drafting their claims.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Honeywell's '976 patent is directed to processes for making
dimensionally stable, multifilament polyester yam.3 Briefly, molten
PET polymer is extruded under high pressure through a plate with
multiple openings (a spinneret) to form a molten spun yarn. The spun
yarn is then solidified by gradually passing it through a cooling zone
1. 341 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
2. U.S. Patent No. 5,630,976 (issued May 20, 1997).
3. Id. at col. 13, line 32-col. 14, line 63.
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and withdrawing it to form a partially crystalline (amorphous) yam
having certain prescribed properties. This "undrawn" yam is then
stretched under appropriate temperature conditions to form a "drawn"
yarn that has the requisite crystalline properties to be twisted, plied,
and treated to form a cord having high tenacity and dimensional
stability.4  The resultant cord can be used for reinforcing tires,
conveyor belts, seat belts, and in other industrial applications.5
All of the independent claims of the '976 patent require that the
drawn or undrawn yams have a "melting point elevation" within a
prescribed range. For example, independent claims 1 and 7 require
that the undrawn yarn have a melting point elevation between 2-10'
C, while claim 14 requires that the drawn yam have a melting point
elevation between 10-14'.
The '976 patent defines the melting point elevation as the
difference between the melting point of a PET yam sample and the
melting point of a sample that has been melted and then rapidly
quenched by liquid nitrogen.6 The patent explains that the melting
point elevation , provides a "direct quantitative measure" of the yam's
"internal morphological structure.",7  The specification goes on to
state that a more sensitive measure of the morphological structure is
the formulaic melting point characteristic "Z.,, 8 However, the claims
themselves refer only to the "melting point elevation"; they make no
mention of the yam's morphological structure or "Z" factor.
It was undisputed that at the time Honeywell filed its patent
application, there were at least four known methods for preparing the
yam samples to measure their melting points-the so-called "cut,"
"coil," "restrained ends," and "ball" methods. 9 In the cut method, as
the name implies, the yam fibers are cut into small, i.e., 0.5 mm,
segments before being melted. The coil method involves coiling the
fibers around an object, such as tweezer tips, before placing them in
the melting pan. In the restrained ends method, the ends of the fibers
are tied to a spool or other device for testing. Finally, the ball method
requires coiling the fibers and then rolling them into a ball between
4. Id. at col. 1, line 54-col. 2, line 4.
5. Id. at col. 1, lines 16-23.
6. Id. at col. 5, lines 2-6.
7. Id. at col. 5, lines 40-46.
8. U.S. Patent No. 5,630,976, supra note 2, at col. 4, line 64-col. 5, line 15.
9. In the Matter of Certain Polyethylene Terephtthalate Yam and Products Containing
Same, Order No. 61: Initial Determination Granting in Part and Denying in Part Respondents'
Motion for Summary Determination of Non-Infringement and Invalidity of U.S. Patent No.
5,630,976, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-457 at 5 (Feb. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Initial Determination].
2004] HONEYWEL INT'L V. U.S. INT'l TRADE COMM'N 519
one's fingers. Although there was some evidence that all four
methods were known in the art, only the first three methods-the cut,
coil, and restrained ends methods-were described in published
materials. The fourth, or ball method, was described only in
Honeywell's confidential, proprietary papers, which it produced
during the litigation under a protective order.
The evidence showed that not only were there multiple testing
methods for determining the melting point of PET yarn, but the four
methods yielded significantly different results. Only Honeywell's
confidential ball method yielded MPE values for Hyosung's accused
PET yarn that were within the ranges recited in the claims. The three
other sample preparation methods yielded MPE values for Hyosung's
yarn that were well outside the claimed ranges.
The '976 patent, however, does not explicitly or inherently
describe any of these particular methods, let alone specify which
method should be used to perform the examples in the specification or
to determine the MPE ranges in the claims. The only information
provided in the patent are that the examples were run using 2 mg
samples and a Perkin-Elmer Differential Scanning Calorimeter
("DSC").' ° The claims themselves, however, do not require the use
of either the Perkin-Elmer DSC or a 2 mg sample size.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2001, Honeywell filed a complaint in the U.S.
International Trade Commission alleging that Hyosung Corporation
and its American subsidiary, Hyosung (America), Inc. (collectively
"Hyosung") were violating the Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, as amended
(19 U.S.C. § 1337), by importing into the United States, selling for
importation, or selling in the United States after importation, PET
yarns manufactured by processes infringing Honeywell's '976 patent.
After reviewing the complaint for sufficiency and conformance with
the rules, the Commission determined in May 2001 to institute an
investigation In re Certain Polyethylene Terephthalate Yarn and
Products Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-457.
The ITC is a quasi-judicial, administrative agency with exclusive
jurisdiction to conduct section 337 investigations. Although the ITC
employs the same substantive patent law as a federal district court,
there are some important procedural differences. For example, the
ITC assigns an attorney from its Office of Unfair Import
10. U.S. Patent No. 5,630,976, supra note 2, at col. 4, line 64-67.
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Investigations ("OUII"), also known as the investigative attorney or
staff attorney, who is intended to represent the public interest. The
investigative attorney initially participates in the investigation as a
neutral party, but eventually takes a position on issues of
infringement, invalidity, and other issues before the administrative
law judge ("ALJ"). After the ALI makes an initial determination on a
dispositive issue, an aggrieved party can petition the Commission to
review the determination and, as appropriate, adopt, modify, reverse,
or remand that determination before it becomes final and appealable.
A. Hyosung's Motion For Summary Determination
Hyosung subsequently moved for summary determination that
Honeywell's patent claims were invalid and not infringed due to the
vagaries of the MPE measurement methodology. Hyosung argued
that Honeywell could not carry its burden of proof on infringement
because, even though the ball method yielded MPE values within the
claimed ranges for some yams, Hyosung could present equally valid
evidence of non-infringement by using the published cut, coil, or
restrained-ends methods. Also, without knowing which of the
conflicting sample preparation methods to use, a competitor would
find it impossible to determine the scope of the claims, how to
practice the claimed invention, or whether the inventors had
possession of the invention at the time they filed their application,
according to Hyosung. Accordingly, Hyosung argued that the claims
were invalid for failing the definiteness, enablement, and written
description requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraphs 1 and 2.11
Honeywell responded that even though the '976 patent does not
expressly disclose or claim any particular method, a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted the patent to require
the use of the ball method because the other three sample preparation
methods (the cut, coil, and restrained ends methods) could not be used
practically with the Perkin-Elmer DSC or 2 mg sample sizes
described in the specification, or were otherwise undesirable. In the
alternative, Honeywell argued that a claim should be found as
infringing if any one of the four sample preparation methods yielded
an MPE value within the claimed range, regardless of the MPE values
yielded by the other methods. This theory later became known as the
"any one" construction of the claims.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
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B. AL! Found the '976 Patent Claims to be Valid but Not
Infringed
On February 4, 2002, the ALJ issued his initial determination
(Order No. 61) on Hyosung's motion. He concluded that the patent
claims were valid, but not infringed.
The ALJ found the essential facts undisputed by either party, i.e.,
that several sample preparation methods were known in the art but
none was expressly disclosed or claimed in the patent; that the various
methods yielded different MPE values; and that only one of those
four methods-the ball-yielded MPE values within the claimed
ranges. 12  Nonetheless, he believed that the choice of sampling
method was a mere detail well-known in the art, and not an essential
or novel element of the invention; thus, the sampling method did not
need to be disclosed in the specification.13 The variation among those
methods, he further wrote, was immaterial because a person of
ordinary skill would probably use several different sample preparation
methods to verify the melting point elevation of a yarn sample.
Therefore, the absence of any description of that detail in the patent
did not render the claims unknowable, unworkable, or otherwise
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112's first or second paragraphs. 14
The lack of any mention of a sample preparation method was
found to be fatal to the question of infringement, however.
Honeywell's only evidence that the claims should be limited to the
ball method was the declaration of its expert, Dr. Weigmann. But
according to the ALJ, without adequate support in the specification,
the expert's declaration proved to be too conclusory, convoluted, and
speculative to be reliable. The ALJ thus rejected Honeywell's theory
that the claims should be read to require the use of the ball method to
determine MPE values.
15
With no basis to narrow the claims, the ALJ concluded that the
claims allowed any sample preparation method known in the art as of
the priority date of the '976 patent. Even though Honeywell could
demonstrate infringement by the ball method, Hyosung could present
equally valid evidence of non-infringement by using the cut, coil, or
restrained ends methods. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Honeywell
could not meet its burden of proof on literal infringement. Further,
12. Initial Determination, supra note 9, at 4-6, 38-39.
13. Id. at 10.
14. Id. at 12-16.
15. Id. at 23-27.
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establishing infringement through the doctrine of equivalents was
held to be barred by prosecution history estoppel.
16
C. Commission Determined the Claims are Invalid and Not
Infringed
Since the ALI had "split the baby" in ruling on Hyosung's
summary determination motion, the parties filed cross-petitions
seeking Commission review of portions of the ALJ's initial
determination. 17 Honeywell petitioned the Commission to review the
ALJ's non-infringement determination, while Hyosung and the
Commission investigative attorney petitioned for review of the
determination of no invalidity.
The review petitioned for is an internal ITC process that permits
the Commission to examine and, if appropriate, adopt, reverse,
modify, or remand an ALJ's initial determination before that initial
determination becomes final and appealable. Although Commission
review is somewhat similar to an appeal, the Commission is not an
appellate court, but is the body responsible for making the final
agency decision, and thus, the Commission does not defer to the ALJ,
even on questions of fact. Rather, Commission review is de novo on
all issues, for it has all the powers the agency would have in making
the initial decision, except as it may limit the issues by notice or
rule. 1
In March 2002, the Commission determined that it would review
only the AL's finding that the claims were not indefinite, but would
not review the findings on non-infringement, written description, or
enablement. 19  Those unreviewed findings became the final
determinations of the Commission under the Commission's rules.
20
Two months later, the Commission reversed the ALJ and
concluded that the '976 patent claims were indeed indefinite.2'
16. Id. at 25-36.
17. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.43 (2002) (Commission rule regarding petitions for review).
18. See Commission Opinion at 9, citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
557(b).
19. In the Matter of Certain Polyethylene Terephtthalate Yam and Products Containing
Same, Notice of Commission Determination to Review In Part An Order Granting-In-Part And
Denying-In-Part A Motion For Summary Determination Of Invalidity And Non-Infringement
Of The Only Patent At Issue In The Investigation; Determination to Grant Two Motions to
Strike Exhibits, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-457 (Mar. 21, 2002); see also Commission Opinion at
1-3.
20. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(h)(2) (2003).
21. In the Matter of Certain Polyethylene Terephtthalate Yam and Products Containing
Same, Notice of Commission Determination To Reverse The Decision Of The Presiding
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Although the Commission agreed with the ALJ that the claims
allowed any method of sample preparation, the Commission found
that this rendered the claims indefinite because the different methods
had a "substantial effect" on the melting point elevation, and thus, on
the scope of the claims. The Commission also found that the claims
were not as precise as they could be, given that publications in the art
typically describe the sample preparation method that was used. The
Commission concluded that the claims were indefinite because they
did not adequately inform competitors of their scope.
D. The Federal Circuit Affirmed the Commission's Finding of
Indefiniteness
Honeywell appealed the Commission's final determination of
non-infringement and indefiniteness to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. Briefly, Honeywell argued that the term "melting
point elevation" was susceptible to three constructions. First, there
was Honeywell's preferred construction that the claims are limited to
the ball method, based on the declaration of its expert, Dr. Weigmann.
Second, there was the Commission's construction that the claim term
covers any sample preparation method. Honeywell argued it had
proved infringement under this construction by using the ball method,
regardless of any contrary evidence presented by Hyosung. Finally,
Honeywell argued that the Commission had, in effect, adopted a third
construction that required proving infringement by all four methods.
This "all methods" construction, Honeywell argued, was improper
because it rendered the claims inoperative. As for indefiniteness,
Honeywell argued that a person skilled in the art need only conduct
minor testing to conclude that the examples were performed using the
ball method.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, and in a precedential opinion,
affirmed the ITC's determination that the claims were indefinite
under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph.22 The Court vacated the
Commission's non-infringement finding as moot, however, on the
basis that infringement cannot be properly determined where the
claims lack a clear and definitive construction.
23
Administrative Law Judge On The Issue Of Indefiniteness; Termination Of The Investigation
With A Finding Of No Violation, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-457 (May 17, 2002).
22. Honeywell, 341 F.3d at 1334.
23. Id. at 1342 ("Because the claims are indefinite, the claims, by definition, cannot be
construed (citations omitted). Without a discemable claim construction, an infringement
analysis cannot be performed.").
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In so holding, the Federal Circuit summarily disposed of
Honeywell's theory that the claims should be limited to the "ball"
method of sample preparation.24 Like the Commission before it, the
Federal Circuit found nothing in the intrinsic evidence to support such
a limitation. The only remaining evidence in support of this
construction was the extrinsic testimony of Honeywell's expert, Dr.
Weigmann 2 5  "Adopting Honeywell's proffered construction," the
court wrote, "would require the court to impose a limitation that is not
only outside the bounds of the claims, the written description, and the
prosecution history, but is also outside the scope of any written
publication. ' '26 Moreover, the court did not find the brief references
to a Perkin-Elmer DSC and 2 mg samples in the examples compelling
because those conditions did not actually exclude the use of any of the
other methods.27
Just as the claims cannot be limited to the ball method only, the
court concluded that the claims could not be construed to mean that
infringement can be proven by considering "any one" method of
sample preparation. The sample preparation method is "critical in
determining MPE," the court wrote, because different sample
preparation methods yield different results. Without knowing which
method to use, competitors could not discern whether their yams fell
inside or outside the claims, i.e., whether they were practicing the
invention or successfully designing around it.
28
That left only the "all method" construction, which supposedly
meant that that the claims could be found infringed only if all of the
sample preparation methods yielded MPE values within the claimed
ranges. Despite Honeywell's argument that such a construction
would render the claims inoperable, the Federal Circuit refused to
construe the claims to preserve their validity. Rather, the Court held
the '976 patent claims were invalid, either by indefiniteness or by lack
of enablement.
29
24. Id. at 1340.
25. Id. at 1340.
26. Id. at 1341.
27. Id. at 1329-40.
28. Honeywell, 341 F.3d at 1341, citing Morton Int'l v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (claims are indefinite when person skilled in the art could not discern
whether a given compound was within the scope of the claims).
29. Id. at 1341.
2004] HONEYWELL INT'L V. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N 525
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HONEYWELL DECISION
The problem with Honeywell's claims was not simply that there
were multiple methods for preparing the yam samples to measure
their MPE, or even that the '976 patent did not identify which of those
various methods should be used. The central problem was that those
sample preparation methods yielded significantly different results.
One method yielded an MPE value that fell inside the claimed ranges,
while the other methods yielded MPE values outside those ranges for
any given yam. It was this fact that rendered the multiplicity of
methods and lack of description so significant.
It was this fact that also distinguished the Honeywell case from
PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.,3° one of the cases
cited by Honeywell and discussed by the Federal Circuit.3 In PPG,
the claims were directed to a tinted, ultraviolet-absorbing glass having
an ultraviolet transmittance of 31% or less.32 The accused infringer
argued that the claims were indefinite because the patentees failed to
specify which of several conventional methods should be used to
measure the ultraviolet transmittance. 33 The court found that the
multiplicity of methods made no difference because they all yielded
essentially the same result.34 On that basis, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the claims were sufficiently definite as to put the
public on notice as to their scope, and affirmed the lower court's
ruling of no invalidity.
35
Only after it became clear that different sample preparation
methods yielded different MPE values did the absence of any
limitation on those methods in the Honeywell patent become
significant. Honeywell attempted to construct such a limitation from
a few clues in the patent specification, namely, the use of a Perkin-
Elmer differential scanning calorimeter and 2 mg samples. Yet none
of those supposed limitations was included in the claims themselves.
This led the Federal Circuit to reject Honeywell's argument that the
claims should be limited to its confidential, proprietary ball method.
Left unmentioned in the Court's opinion was the sheer impracticality,
even impossibility, of Honeywell's assertion that a person of ordinary
skill in the art could: rerun all of the examples in patent using all four
30. 75 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
31. Honeywell, 341 F.3d at 1341.
32. PPG, 75 F.3d at 1561.
33. Id. at 1562.
34. Id. at 1563.
35. Id.
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sample preparation methods; accomplish the same results presented in
the patent's examples, even though the methods are far from precise;
and thereby determine which method was used.
The absence of any meaningful discussion in the Honeywell
patent of the sample preparation method distinguishes this case from
Exxon Research and Engineering Co. v. United States, which was
discussed in the Commission's opinion.36 In Exxon Research, the
claims recited the term "U subL," which is the velocity of a liquid
along a reactor column. The claims did not explain, however,
whether "U subL" referred to interstitial velocity (the true or accurate
velocity at which the liquid rises in a column) or the superficial
velocity (the ideal velocity, without consideration of the internal
structures, gas bubbles, particles, or other impediments to liquid
flow). 37 Even though the interstitial and superficial velocities could
be significantly different, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
claims were not indefinite because there were sufficient indications in
the claims and specification to lead a person of ordinary skill to
conclude that "U subL" referred to interstitial and not superficial
velocity. 38  The court concluded that "the degree of ambiguity
injected into the claims by the patentees' lack of precision is therefore
not fatal."39 In Honeywell, however, there were no such meaningful
indications at all. Thus, even though Honeywell and Exxon Research
both involved quantitative parameters that varied significantly with
the manner in which they were measured, the cases reached opposite
results due to the presence or absence of any discussion in the patent
that might narrow the parameter at issue.
Honeywell, PPG, Exxon Research, and other such cases
emphasize the importance of closely examining the clarity,
definiteness, and completeness of any quantitative parameters or
formulae that are recited in or related to the claims. This examination
does not stop with the claim terms themselves, but requires looking
behind each quantitative term to determine whether a person skilled in
the art would know how to measure or calculate that parameter. For
example, the term melting point elevation in the Honeywell case did
not itself appear indefinite since it was defined in the specification.
Yet, it was rendered indefinite in light of the fact that there are
different methods of determining MPE and those methods yielded
36. 265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
37. Id. at 1382-83.
38. Id. at 1383-84.
39. Id. at 1384.
[ ol. 20
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significantly different results. The case turned, then, not so much on
the claim term itself but on how that term could be measured, and not
so much on what was in the claim but on what was left out of the
claim or specification.
This issue will become increasingly important as more and more
patentees create new parameters to describe or claim their invention.
In those cases in particular, the patent applicant must carefully define
each new parameter and scrutinize the manner in which it is to be
measured or calculated in order to ensure that the patent satisfies the
definiteness, enablement, and other requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
But this problem may also arise even when using established terms, as
when they have multiple meanings (e.g., Exxon Research) or can be
measured by different means (e.g., PPG). In Honeywell, both
situations were in play. The patentees invented the term "melting
point elevation" (the difference between two melting point values) but
failed to recognize that those melting point values could be measured
through different means, with substantially different results. That
failure cost the patentees their claims.
V. CONCLUSION
Patentees should not be beguiled by the use of quantitative
parameters or formulae in their claims. The facial clarity or precision
of such terms may be only an illusion, as when the parameter is
susceptible to more than one meaning or can be measured in more
than one way. Indefiniteness may be a particular problem when
patentees invent their own parameters if they fail to clearly define that
term and the manner in which it is to be measured or calculated.
Avoiding this problem requires scrutinizing and clarifying not only
the meaning of the claim term itself, but also any other parameters,
formulae, test methods, or other factors that may affect the definition,
measurement, calculation, or determination of that claim term.
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